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HEADQUARTERS INVOLVEMENT, SOCIALIZATION, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BEHAVIORS IN MNC SUBSIDIARIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
Headquarters of multinational corporations can be involved in their subsidiaries and help with the 
development and transfer of innovative ideas. However, headquarters involvement might not 
always be desired or needed, and it can thus be perceived as interference with local activities, 
potentially reducing local willingness to go the extra mile. We address the lack of knowledge 
about subsidiary manager behavior by answering the following question: How does headquarters 
involvement influence the proactive behavior of subsidiary managers to push for new and 
innovative ideas? Using data from 120 top managers in subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, we find that the negative relationship between headquarters involvement and their 
subsidiary managers’ support for initiatives can be reduced when socialization mechanisms such 
as a common corporate culture or rotation programs are put in place.  
 
Keywords: Headquarters involvement; subsidiary initiatives; entrepreneurial behaviors; 
socialization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One important way in which headquarters contribute to the competitiveness of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) is by orchestrating the emergence and diffusion of innovative ideas across 
globally dispersed units (Doz, Santos and Williamson, 2001). In this role, headquarters face a 
fundamental challenge: although headquarters can help with the development and transfer of 
subsidiary initiatives by being involved locally in their subsidiaries (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand and 
Martin, 2011), local involvement is not always desired or needed by subsidiary managers and can 
thus be perceived as undue interference, potentially discouraging subsidiary managers from going 
the extra mile (Bouquet, Barsoux and Levi, 2015; Conroy and Collings, 2016). 
The broader discussion of the involvement of headquarters in subsidiary activities (Mudambi, 
2011; Narula, 2014) implicitly highlights an apparently irreconcilable tension between the 
potentially positive effects of involvement for overall efficiency and coordination, and the 
potentially negative effects of involvement for local initiative-taking (Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012; 
Stea, Foss and Foss, 2015). However, little is known about the consequences that headquarters 
involvement has on the proactive behavior of subsidiary managers. In fact, most of the literature 
on headquarters involvement and subsidiary initiatives focuses on the organizational level of 
analysis and neglects subsidiary managers’ reactions to headquarters involvement and the 
motivational and behavioral elements underlying subsidiary initiatives (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand 
and Martin, 2011; Schmid, Dzedek and Lehrer, 2014; Strutzenberger and Ambos, 2014).  
We see the neglect of the individual manager as problematic. Qualitative and conceptual 
studies indicate that headquarters involvement likely discourage subsidiary managers from acting 
in proactive ways (Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2011; Conroy and Collings, 2016; Foss, Foss 
and Nell, 2012). However, the proactive behavior of subsidiary managers has recently been 
shown to significantly influence the emergence of subsidiary initiatives that can be beneficial for 
the whole MNC (Nuruzzaman, Gaur and Sambharya, 2018; O’Brien et al., 2018). Thus, we want 
to investigate how headquarters involvement influences the proactive behavior of subsidiary 
managers to push for new and innovative ideas in their units (what we refer to as ‘initiative 
facilitation behavior’); we also investigate the circumstances under which this effect might be 
stronger or weaker.  
In this paper, we propose that headquarters can negatively influence the initiative facilitation 
behavior of subsidiary managers but that this relationship depends on the importance of intra-
organizational boundaries. Individuals divide the world into the group to which they belong (the 
in-group) and the other group (the out-group) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). When the boundaries 
between the two groups are salient, stereotyping and conflicts are likely to occur (Hinds and 
Mortensen, 2005; Kramer, 1999). In contrast, cooperation between the different groups is 
facilitated when the boundaries are not strong and easily crossed by individuals (Schotter et al., 
2017; Vora and Kostova, 2007). Accordingly, we argue that socialization mechanisms—that is, 
mechanisms that facilitate the development of a shared understanding and mission across the 
organization—reduce the importance of boundaries between the subsidiaries and the other units 
of the MNC. Information and knowledge about the subsidiaries should flow better to 
headquarters as a result of socialization, thus increasing mutual understanding, making 
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headquarters more aware of when to be involved and how, and helping subsidiary managers 
better understand the rationale behind headquarters involvement. All of this should lead to 
headquarters being involved without necessarily compromising subsidiary managers’ initiative 
facilitation behavior.  
With this study, we make important contributions to the literatures on headquarters 
involvement and subsidiary initiatives. Being involved is a way for headquarters to contribute to 
the development and transfer of subsidiary initiatives. Accordingly, previous studies have found 
that headquarters involvement can add value to their subsidiaries and to the overall MNC 
(Ciabuschi, Dellestrand and Martin, 2011; Nell and Ambos, 2013). In contrast, our study shows 
that headquarters involvement actually hampers a behavior that enables subsidiary initiatives to 
emerge in the first place. We extend the idea that headquarters involvement, which is perceived 
as inappropriate by subsidiary managers, is likely to harm entrepreneurial and proactive 
behaviors (Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2011; Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012; Stea, Foss, and 
Foss, 2015) by identifying socialization mechanisms as boundary conditions of this relationship.  
Additionally, consistent with prior research, our study indicates that socialization mechanisms 
can be used to softly control the actions of subsidiaries (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Björkman, 
Rasmussen and Li, 2004). However, our study also extends Foss, Foss and Nell’s (2012) 
proposition that socialization influences the extent to which headquarters become involved. 
Indeed, given that socialization mitigates the negative consequences of headquarters 
involvement, it seems that socialization influences the appropriateness of headquarters 
involvement or at least its perceived appropriateness by the subsidiary managers.     
Finally, by introducing a new measure that captures the proactive behavior of subsidiary 
managers to push for and support the emergence of innovative ideas in their units, we elaborate 
on recent studies that highlight the importance of subsidiary manager activities (O’Brien et al., 
2018; Strutzenberger and Ambos, 2014). Headquarters involvement can increase the quality of 
subsidiary initiatives and their applicability to other parts of the MNC. Our study highlights that 
it is important to consider subsidiary manager behavior in the subsidiary initiative process 
because – under certain circumstances – headquarters involvement is negatively related to a key 
behavioral element behind subsidiary initiatives.  
 
LITERATURE BACKGROUND 
Headquarters involvement and subsidiary initiatives 
The existence of the headquarters unit is justified by its ability to add or create value for the 
whole firm (Campbell, Goold and Alexander, 1995). Accordingly, headquarters are responsible 
for organizing the firm’s activities in a way that strengthens the competitiveness of the firm 
(Chandler, 1991). Headquarters can create value by contributing to the development of these 
initiatives and by organizing synergies with other subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, Ambos and Bouquet, 
2017; Collis and Montgomery, 1998; Decreton et al., 2017; Goold and Campbell, 1998). 
However, through those actions, headquarters interfere with their subsidiary managers’ activities 
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in ways that can be detrimental to the conditions of subsidiary initiatives (Stea, Foss and Foss, 
2015). This dilemma makes it particularly challenging for headquarters to manage the emergence 
and diffusion of innovative ideas (Mudambi, 2011; Narula, 2014).  
Being actively involved in their subsidiaries gives headquarters the opportunity to contribute 
to the development of local initiatives. Headquarters that are engaged in their subsidiaries have 
been shown to add value to those subsidiaries by providing them with guidance and advice 
(Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007; Foss, 1997), as well as relevant information, knowledge, and 
resources (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012; Nell, Decreton and Ambos, 2016). In addition, 
headquarters can add value by challenging their subsidiaries’ strategies and tactics in developing 
initiatives (Nell and Ambos, 2013).  
Organizing synergies between subsidiaries is another aspect of the parenting advantage that is 
important for subsidiary initiatives (cf. Campbell, Goold and Alexander, 1995; Chandler, 1991; 
Egelhoff, 2010; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1998). By being involved in their subsidiaries, 
headquarters can steer local initiatives in particular directions (Forsgren, Holm and Johanson, 
2005; Foss, 1997). For example, headquarters managers active in their subsidiaries’ boards can 
help to coordinate the subsidiary’s activities and ensure that locally developed initiatives can be 
useful elsewhere in the firm (Du, Deloof and Jorissen, 2011; 2015; Leksell and Lindgren, 1982). 
Additionally, when headquarters are involved in their subsidiaries, the legitimacy of the 
initiatives and projects undertaken in these subsidiaries increases, which facilitates their transfer 
to other parts of the firm. Thus, headquarters involvement has been found to influence the impact 
and importance of subsidiary innovation not only at the subsidiary level but also at the MNC 
level (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand and Martin, 2011).  
Some recent work suggests that the positive consequences that headquarters involvement 
seems to have for the subsidiary or the MNC are not equally straightforward for the willingness 
of subsidiary managers to go the extra mile. Indeed, managers at headquarters are at a knowledge 
disadvantage and do not necessarily know the best times to become involved in their subsidiaries 
(Alfoldi, Clegg and McGaughey, 2012). Consequently, headquarters become involved because of 
the normative expectations associated with their hierarchical status, leading to potentially 
inappropriate and harmful involvement (Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2012; 2017; Lind and 
Kang, 2017; Yamin, Tsai and Holm, 2011). In a conceptual study, Foss, Foss and Nell (2012) 
proposed that headquarters involvement can be perceived as micro-management and can 
negatively influence the efforts of subsidiary managers both in their job roles and in their extra-
role behaviors. Additionally, the knowledge disadvantage of headquarters can lead to unrealistic 
demands that frustrate subsidiary managers (Holm et al., 2017). Along these lines, headquarters 
involvement that does not correspond to what headquarters previously promised can trigger 
subsidiary manager behaviors that are not necessarily aligned with what the headquarters expects 
(ul Haq, Drogendijk and Holm, 2017). Other qualitative studies have shown that headquarters 
involvement, even when well-intentioned, can ‘suffocate’ the subsidiary managers (e.g., with too 
many information requests or visits) and harm enthusiasm and extra-role behavior (Bouquet, 
Barsoux and Levy, 2015; Conroy and Collings, 2016). 
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The literature on subsidiary initiatives is relatively quiet on the question of how headquarters 
involvement possibly influences the entrepreneurial behavior of subsidiary managers. In fact, this 
literature has started to acknowledge a lack of understanding about what stimulates subsidiary 
managers to act in an entrepreneurial manner (Schmid, Dzedek and Lehrer, 2014; Strutzenberger 
and Ambos, 2014). Arguably, subsidiary managers play an important role in influencing the 
activities undertaken in subsidiaries. However, only a few recent studies have empirically 
explored how the characteristics and activities of subsidiary managers matter in enabling 
subsidiary initiatives (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016; Nuruzzaman, Gaur and 
Sambharya, 2018; O’Brien et al., 2018).  
Overall, research has shown that being involved can help headquarters to add value to their 
subsidiaries and to the MNC. While qualitative work supports the idea that headquarters 
involvement can have negative consequences for the willingness of subsidiary managers to go the 
extra mile, we know little about the conditions under which this happens. Particularly, we lack 
knowledge about the influence of headquarters involvement on the proactive entrepreneurial 
behavior of subsidiary managers. Nevertheless, the literature on boundaries in MNCs provides 
insights into the relationships between organizational units, and those insights are relevant to this 
study. 
Boundaries in MNCs 
Boundaries between organizational sub-groups can be more or less important, and reducing the 
thickness of those boundaries and helping individuals to cross them is valuable for overall 
coordination (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000). This can be done with organizational socialization 
mechanisms such as establishing a common corporate culture and / or with individual 
socialization mechanisms such as rotation programs (Smale et al., 2015; Schotter et al., 2017).  
Organizational-level socialization mechanisms that facilitate the development of a shared 
understanding and mission across the organization (Van Maanen and Schein, 1977) (e.g., 
common corporate culture) have a long history in the literature on headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships (Kostova, Marano and Tallman, 2016). Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) initially 
suggested that closely aligned interests and values are an effective way to manage headquarters-
subsidiary relations. Building on this perspective, many others have considered the use of 
socialization as a way to increase trust and communication, thus leading to better information- 
and knowledge-sharing across MNC units (Björkman, Rasmussen and Li, 2004; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2009). More 
recently, scholars have initiated a discussion on the role of socialization in the dual identification 
of managers with both their units and the overall MNC (Pant and Ramachandran, 2017; Smale et 
al., 2015; Vora, Kostova and Roth, 2007). In sum, by increasing shared goals and values across 
the MNC, organizational socialization mechanisms have been shown to reduce the thickness of 
boundaries between the different units and to increase overall coordination of the MNC (Barner-
Rasmussen and Björkman, 2007).   
Individual-level socialization mechanisms that make it easier for individuals to directly cross 
boundaries between different units (e.g., rotation programs) have also received considerable 
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attention in the MNC literature (Kostova, Marano and Tallman, 2016; Schotter et al., 2017). 
Transferring managers across different units of the MNC has been shown to be an important way 
to generate loose-coupling and interdependence between units (Edström and Galbraith, 1977; 
Harzing, 1999; 2001). Recently, boundary-spanning mechanisms have been shown to increase 
knowledge sharing and understanding of what other units of the MNC are doing, thus fostering 
confidence in other units and a higher willingness to cooperate with them (Klueter and Monteiro, 
2017; Schotter and Beamish, 2011). In addition, Kleinbaum and Stuart (2014) found that 
individuals sent on an assignment at their company’s headquarters created relationships with 
other units of the firm and also maintained these connections after coming back to their units. 
Overall, mechanisms that prompt individuals to cross organizational boundaries directly are an 
important way of increasing collaboration between units of the MNC (Mudambi, 2011).  
In addition, while most of the literature has conceptualized these mechanisms as means by 
which headquarters can control their subsidiaries, shared goals and values, as well as greater 
collaboration and linkages, might also influence headquarters’ activities. Foss, Foss and Nell 
(2012: 255), for example, suggested that headquarters can “get socialized as well” and that this 
might reduce the opportunistically motivated involvement of headquarters in their subsidiaries.  
In sum, research has focused on how headquarters involvement can add value to their 
subsidiaries and to the MNC. However, recent qualitative and conceptual contributions urge us to 
pay more attention to the consequences of headquarters involvement for subsidiary manager 
behavior. According to the literature on boundaries in MNCs, it appears that socialization 
mechanisms can be an important element of this relationship.  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
By being involved in their subsidiaries, headquarters are better able to add value to them (Nell 
and Ambos, 2013). Headquarters involved in their subsidiaries can provide appropriate guidance 
and advice (Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007; Foss, 1997) as well as relevant information, 
knowledge, and resources (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012; Nell, Decreton and Ambos, 2016). 
However, we argue that headquarters involvement is likely to have negative consequences for the 
behavior of subsidiary managers.   
In particular, we posit that subsidiary managers can perceive headquarters involvement as a 
burden that reduces their ability and inclination to facilitate subsidiary initiatives. This burden 
manifests itself in the preparation for, supervision of, and follow-up to visits from headquarters’ 
managers (Bouquet, Barsoux and Levy, 2015). These tasks are time- and energy-consuming and 
reduce the attention that subsidiary managers can direct towards identifying and supporting new 
opportunities in their units.  
In addition, the willingness of subsidiary managers to go the extra mile is likely to be reduced 
when headquarters is involved. Creative entrepreneurial processes such as subsidiary initiatives 
require a significant amount of enthusiasm from the individuals pursuing them. Indeed, 
individuals are very unlikely to take the risks inherent to these processes if they are not strongly 
inclined to make extra efforts in their jobs (Dewett, 2007; Marvel et al., 2007). However, the 
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involvement of managers from headquarters in their subsidiaries’ activities is a form of 
interference that reminds the subsidiary managers that headquarters’ managers have the final 
word, even though subsidiary managers are given some discretion over the activities they pursue 
locally (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1999; Foss, 2003; Foss, Foss and Vazquez, 2006). As a 
result of the interference associated with the involvement of headquarters’ managers, subsidiary 
managers will be less eager to make extra efforts in and beyond their jobs (Stea, Foss and Foss 
2015). Eventually, reduced willingness to go the extra mile will lead to less proactivity in 
facilitating the development of new ideas (Crant, 2000; Grant and Ashford, 2008).  
Overall, we argue that headquarters involvement will reduce the ability and willingness of 
subsidiary managers to facilitate the development of entrepreneurial activities and will make the 
subsidiary environment less favorable to creativity and innovativeness. 
Hypothesis 1: Headquarters involvement will be negatively related to the initiative facilitation 
behavior of subsidiary managers. 
 Organizational socialization mechanisms were initially presented as a way to integrate new 
employees by teaching them the goals, values, and beliefs of the organization (Chao et al., 1994; 
Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). Yet, organizational socialization mechanisms are also relevant 
for the management of multi-unit firms (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Nohria and Ghoshal, 
1994). Mechanisms such as international task groups and a common corporate culture reduce the 
salience of boundaries between the different organizational units. This increases trust in and 
identification with members of other units of the MNC (Reade, 2001; Smale et al., 2015; Vora 
and Kostova, 2007).  
Organizational socialization mechanisms provide occasions for more formal and informal 
knowledge exchanges (Schulz, 2003). Subsidiary managers have more opportunities to share their 
concerns and wishes with headquarters’ managers (Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012), leading to stronger 
alignment among the different units (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). Given the resulting shared 
understanding of what other units are doing, headquarters involvement will be more informed 
(Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2011; Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012).  
Subsidiary managers’ reactions to headquarters involvement will be more positive if 
organizational socialization mechanisms are in place. Indeed, reduced organizational boundaries 
will make subsidiary managers less suspicious about headquarters’ actions (Hornsey and Hogg, 
2000; Kramer, 1999) and will increase subsidiary-parent cooperation (Lee and Williams, 2007; 
Vora and Kostova, 2007). In turn, headquarters involvement should be less likely to be perceived 
as a controlling exercise and more likely to be seen as a positive and non-threatening action. For 
this reason, it should also be less likely to negatively affect subsidiary managers’ willingness to 
push for and support local initiatives (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988; Reade, 2003). 
In sum, organizational socialization should act as a buffer (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Nielsen, 2014) and reduce the negative effects of headquarters involvement on their subsidiary 
managers’ engagement and support for initiatives. 
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Hypothesis 2: Organizational socialization mechanisms will positively moderate the negative 
relationship between headquarters involvement and the initiative facilitation behavior of 
subsidiary managers. 
 Individual socialization mechanisms such as inpatriation and expatriation programs help 
and encourage individuals to cross intra-organizational boundaries, however salient they may be 
(Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Harzing, 1999; 2001). These intra-company transfers of individual 
managers enable the enactment of international networks of practice by helping to develop strong 
and lasting relationships across organizational units (Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). 
These relationships are key to increasing the shared understanding between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Indeed, subsidiary managers with experience in their companies’ headquarters are 
well positioned to improve the scope and richness of knowledge transfer through formal and 
informal channels (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Cano-Kollmann et al., 2016). Thus, subsidiary 
managers who have developed strong relationships with managers at the firm’s headquarters can 
be efficient conduits of information and knowledge (Birkinshaw, Ambos and Bouquet, 2017; 
Tippmann, Scott and Parker, 2017). Thus, they are better able to convey their wishes and to express 
when the involvement of headquarters’ managers is needed and desired.  
Additionally, subsidiary managers with work experience at their companies’ headquarters have 
a greater comprehension of organizational dynamics within the MNC network (Nuruzzaman, Gaur 
and Sambharya, 2018). They can also use their personal connections to obtain knowledge about 
strategic and operational matters (Gaur, Delios and Singh, 2007). As a result, work experience at 
headquarters is likely to increase the subsidiary managers’ understanding of why headquarters’ 
managers become involved.  
A logic of good faith should be more prevalent among subsidiary managers who have had the 
opportunity for direct contact with headquarters (Schotter et al., 2017). In fact, a stronger 
willingness to cooperate and collaborate between the subsidiary’s and the headquarters’ managers 
should follow. Following work experience at their companies’ headquarters, subsidiary managers 
should be more likely to overcome home-country bias and to develop a global mindset (Perlmutter, 
1969; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) that will lead to better interaction with headquarters managers 
(Black, Gregersen and Mendenhall, 1992; Mudambi, 2011). As a result, subsidiary managers 
should perceive headquarters involvement more positively and be more inclined to promote and 
support the development of new ideas.  
Taken together, these arguments suggest that individual-level socialization mechanisms that 
allow the transfer of managers from subsidiaries to headquarters should reduce the negative effects 
of headquarters involvement on subsidiary managers’ engagement and support for initiatives. 
Hypothesis 3: Individual socialization mechanisms will positively moderate the negative 
relationship between headquarters involvement and the initiative facilitation behavior of 
subsidiary managers. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
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METHODS 
Sample and procedure 
To compile our sample, we used the Orbis database to randomly select 2000 manufacturing 
subsidiaries located in six European countries. Data collection was conducted between November 
2013 and August 2015. We did not restrict the home countries of the MNC, which allowed for 
collocation between headquarters and subsidiaries (for 9% of our final sample). To ensure a link 
between the subsidiary and the headquarters, the minimum level of ownership was set to at least 
50.01%, and to avoid private equity firms, hedge funds or families, we selected only industrial 
companies as domestic or global ultimate owners. For each subsidiary, we used the Orbis 
database and online research to check whether there was a real parent-subsidiary relationship and 
not a single individual or a financial institution as the main shareholder. We identified the direct 
email addresses of the general managers of these companies through Orbis and online research. 
Eventually, we contacted 1576 subsidiary managers.  
The questionnaire was developed by incorporating feedback from two academics who 
identified questions that were vague, ambiguous, or the source of a possible bias. The 
questionnaire was created in English and then translated into the different local languages.  
We kept track of respondents and non-respondents and insured confidentiality by using serial 
numbers on the survey. One follow-up round by mail and another by email, combined with a 
promise to provide results (Dillman, 2000) aimed to ensure a higher response rate. The exclusion 
of responses with missing values led to a final sample size of 120 subsidiaries in 116 MNCs. The 
subsidiaries were located in Austria (34%), Germany (23%), Denmark (16%), Norway (13%), 
Portugal (8%), and Spain (6%). The locations of the headquarters were distributed globally, with 
28% in Germany, 13% in Austria, 11% in Norway, 8% in Switzerland, 7% in Denmark, 6% in 
the USA, 5% in Sweden, 5% in France, and the remaining 20% in 13 other countries. Across the 
six countries, we achieved a response rate of 7.6%. While this is not ideal, it is within the scope 
of recent multi-country studies (Harzing, 1999). To check for non-response bias, we examined 
whether respondents and non-respondents differed on several aspects. Because we did not find 
any significant differences in terms of subsidiary age, size, turnover, headquarters turnover or 
size, we are confident that non-response bias is not an issue.  
Measures 
Subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior1 
                                                          
1 Following a reviewer’s suggestion, we collected additional data for 13% of the subsidiaries in our sample on the 
subsidiary initiatives that occurred after the measurement of our dependent variable and found a positive correlation 
between the two variables (r = 0.4), suggesting a positive relationship between our individual-level dependent 
variable and this subsidiary-level outcome variable.  
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We aimed to measure a proactive behavior that generates a supportive context for subsidiary 
initiatives, and we therefore combined concepts from organizational behavior and international 
business. In particular, we adapted the extra-role behavior scale (used to measure taking charge) 
developed by Morrison and Phelps (1999: 403) (“a discretionary behavior intended to effect 
organizationally functional change”) to the subsidiary initiative context (Ambos et al., 2010). 
Subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior was captured with a four-item question. 
Respondents had to rate the different items on a seven-point scale (1: never to 7: all the time). 
The question was “How often do you personally…that support entrepreneurship activities in your 
subsidiary?,” and the items were “generate creative ideas”, “promote and champion ideas”, ”try 
to improve procedures”, and ”try to instill new work methods”. Examples of entrepreneurship 
activities were given in the questionnaire (e.g., new products that were subsequently sold 
internationally, enhancements to product lines that were already sold internationally) (α = 0.9). 
We conducted a factor analysis and, as all four items loaded on one factor, we used the extracted 
factor score in our analysis.  
Headquarters involvement 
We collected both primary and secondary data to capture our main independent variable. We 
used a procedure adapted from Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) and first asked the respondents 
to identify from one to three partners with whom they interact the most (e.g., competitors, 
suppliers, customers, other firms, universities, local governments, or other institutions). In the 
next step, respondents had to rate the extent to which their headquarters maintained linkages to 
each of these local partners on a five-point scale (1: The headquarters does not know this 
counterpart and 5: there is very frequent contact (more often than once a month)). Additionally, 
the respondents also had to answer on a seven-point scale (1: strongly disagree and 7: strongly 
agree) whether managers from the headquarters are very often present when the subsidiary has 
negotiations with this partner and whether headquarters managers usually want to meet this 
partner when managers from the headquarters are visiting the subsidiary. We put the three scores 
on the same scale (1: very low headquarters involvement to 7: very high headquarters 
involvement) and averaged these for each of the partners, thus creating scores for involvement 
with partner 1 (α = 0.9), with partner 2 (α = 0.9), and with partner 3 (α = 0.9).  
Secondary data were gathered via the Orbis database. We followed Leksell and Lindgren 
(1982) in assessing the degree of headquarters involvement in their subsidiaries’ management 
and operations by collecting the names of all subsidiary board members and identifying which 
ones were headquarters managers. The share of headquarters managers present on the board was 
then converted to a seven-point scale. This score and the other measures of involvement loaded 
on one factor (α = 0.8), and we used the extracted factor score to capture headquarters 
involvement in the subsidiary’s activities. 
Organizational socialization 
To measure organizational socialization, we followed the measure of Nell and Ambos (2013). We 
asked the subsidiary managers to rate the extent to which they agree with three different 
statements. The questions concerned the extent to which 1) the subsidiary and the headquarters 
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share the same values, 2) there are many joint task forces between subsidiary managers and 
headquarters executives, and 3) headquarters invests considerable effort in establishing a 
common corporate culture. We used a seven-point scale (1: strongly disagree and 7: strongly 
agree). The three scores loaded on one factor (α = 0.6), and we used the extracted factor score in 
our analysis. 
Individual socialization 
To measure the individual socialization mechanisms in place (Schotter et al., 2017), we measured 
each respondent’s employment in the headquarters of their current company. Subsidiary 
managers with work experience outside of their units, and in particular in their company’s 
headquarters, have already crossed intra-organizational boundaries; they are consequently more 
aware of activities undertaken in other units of the organization and better able to link different 
units (see Kleinbaum and Stuart, 2014). Our individual socialization variable takes the value of 1 
if the subsidiary managers have work experience in their company’s headquarters, and 0 
otherwise. 
Control variables 
We controlled for several variables that had the potential to influence the results of our study. We 
controlled for subsidiary manager age (logarithmic scale) and education (Master or PhD: 1; other: 
0)2. To differentiate between subsidiaries that have received an entrepreneurial mandate from the 
headquarters versus those that did not, we asked subsidiary managers the following question: 
“Your subsidiary has been given by the headquarters the explicit task of being entrepreneurial.” 
The entrepreneurial mandate control variable was integrated as a dummy variable. We controlled 
for the level of past subsidiary initiatives, as it could influence the level of initiative-taking 
behavior of subsidiary managers. We used a five-item scale adapted from Ambos et al. (2010). 
The respondents answered the following question: “To what extent have the following activities 
occurred over the last 5 years?” on a seven-point scale (1: never to 7: plentifully). The questions 
referred to new products developed that were then sold internationally, to successful bids for 
corporate investments in the subsidiary, to new international business activities first developed in 
the subsidiary, to enhancements to product lines already sold internationally, and to new 
corporate investments in R&D or manufacturing attracted by the subsidiary (α = 0.8). We also 
controlled for subsidiary-level variables – such as age and number of employees – using 
secondary data extracted from Orbis. We controlled for headquarters type by asking subsidiary 
managers to indicate whether the headquarters they mainly report to is a corporate headquarters 
(versus divisional or regional) (Yes: 1; No: 0). Finally, we controlled for geographic distance by 
measuring the distance in kilometers between the subsidiary city and the headquarters city, as 
indicated by the subsidiary managers. Descriptive statistics and correlations are available in Table 
1.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
                                                          
2 We did not control for gender as only one subsidiary manager in our sample was a female.  
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Common method variance 
We followed different procedures to reduce the likelihood of potential common method bias. 
First, several of our variables were composed of secondary and/ or objective information. Our 
independent variable consisted of both primary information from the subsidiary managers and 
secondary information on the subsidiary board. The dummy capturing the respondent’s prior 
experience at headquarters is very much in line with what Ng and Feldman call “‘objective’ 
background and work history” variables (Ng and Feldman, 2012: 1039), where respondents are 
asked about precise aspects of their work (e.g., whether they have previously worked at 
headquarters or not); this information should thus be unlikely to be under/over-reported. 
Regarding our measure of subsidiary manager initiative facilitation, although individuals may 
have biased perceptions and biased views of their actual behavior, self-reported measures remain 
an accepted way of capturing perceptions and behaviors among employees (Howard, 1994). In 
particular, it may be argued that employees are optimally suited to self-report variables such as 
the proactive generation of creative behaviors, as they are the ones who are aware of the subtle 
things they do in their jobs (Janssen, 2004; Shalley, Zhou and Oldham, 2004). Furthermore, 
although self-reported measures are subject to bias, they have also been found to correlate 
substantially with supervisory ratings (Axtell et al., 2000).  
Second, we ensured anonymity and initiated the questionnaire by stating that some 
headquarters are involved and others not, that some headquarters require their subsidiary 
managers to be proactive and some not, thereby indicating that all answers are fine. Additionally, 
our questionnaire consisted of different scales, and some of them were reversed, which 
diminishes the risk of biases.  
Third, we test a complex model with interaction effects, and this makes it less likely that the 
respondents are “guided by a cognitive map that includes difficult to visualize interaction and 
non-linear effects” (Chang, Van Witteloostuijn and Eden, 2010: 179).  
In addition, we performed a number of statistical analyses to assess common method bias. 
First, a Harman’s one-factor test on the items indicated that common method bias was not a 
major issue. That is, multiple factors were detected, and the variance did not merely stem from 
the first factors (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Second, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis – 
including all the underlying items that together form the variables in our model – to test whether 
they loaded on the same factor (a Single Factor Model). The assumption was that the appearance 
of a single factor as the common denominator across all items would reflect the presence of 
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff, 2003). However, in our case, 
the goodness-of-fit statistics of this model were highly unsatisfactory, suggesting that our data do 
not suffer from major common methods bias. Finally, we introduced a marker variable to further 
test for common method bias and gained support for the conclusion that common method testing 
did not bias our results (Malhotra, Kim and Patil, 2006).  
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Taken together, these statistical tests and variable-specific theoretical considerations make us 
confident that the effects that we capture in our model are not substantially influenced by 
common method variance.  
RESULTS 
We used hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to estimate the coefficients 
and model fit. We checked for the assumptions of linearity, normality of residuals, and undue 
outliers, but we did not detect any irregularities. We used Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of 
the IM-test to check for heteroskedasticity, and the results were all insignificant. Variance 
inflation factors were below 10 in all specifications (mean VIF = 1.13), the eigenvalue was high 
enough (0.51) and the condition number was low enough (24.93) to suggest that multicollinearity 
was not an issue.  
Model 1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 includes the direct effects of 
organizational and individual socialization. Model 3 includes the direct effect of headquarters 
involvement. Models 4 and 5 include the moderating effects of organizational and individual 
socialization, respectively. Finally, Model 6 includes all variables and moderation effects (see 
Table 2). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Our results support our three hypotheses. As expected in our hypothesis 1, we found a 
negative and significant relationship between headquarters involvement and the initiative 
facilitation behavior of subsidiary managers (β = - 0.357; p = 0.022). We found support for our 
hypothesis 2 on the moderating effect of organizational socialization on the relationship between 
headquarters involvement and subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior (β = 0.181; p = 
0.043). Our hypothesis 3 was also supported, as we found a positive and significant moderating 
effect individual socialization on the relationships between headquarters involvement and 
subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior (β = 0.356; p = 0.041). 
Levene’s robust test for the equality of variances between the groups was significant for 
organizational socialization and suggested that the variance in initiative facilitation behavior is 
restricted at high levels of organizational socialization (Cortina, Köhler and Nielsen, 2015). 
Levene’s robust test was, however, not significant for individual socialization. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the effect of headquarters involvement on subsidiary manager 
initiative facilitation is strongly negative when subsidiary managers reported low levels of 
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organizational socialization (β = -0.557; p<0.001) and that this relationship is less negative but 
insignificant when the subsidiary managers reported high levels of organizational socialization (β 
= -0.177; n.s.).  In other words, we find support for our buffering interaction hypothesis that 
headquarters involvement has little influence on initiative facilitation behavior for subsidiary 
managers with high levels of organizational socialization.  
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Similarly, Figure 3 shows that the effect of headquarters involvement on subsidiary manager 
initiative facilitation is strongly negative when individual socialization mechanisms were not in 
place (β = -0.358; p<0.001) and that this relationship is positive but insignificant in the presence 
of individual socialization mechanisms (β = -0.002; n.s.). In other words, we find support for our 
buffering interaction hypothesis that headquarters involvement has little influence on initiative 
facilitation behavior when individual socialization mechanisms are put in place.  
Additional probing of the data revealed that headquarters involvement was negatively and 
significantly related to initiative facilitation behavior for the managers without individual 
socialization mechanisms who scored below 5.3 on our 7-point organizational socialization 
mechanisms measure (29% of our final sample).  
In sum, to counter-balance the negative influence of headquarters involvement on the initiative 
facilitation behavior of subsidiary managers, individual socialization mechanisms are per se 
sufficient. However, organizational socialization has to be very high when individual 
mechanisms are not in place.   
We conducted robustness checks to ensure that our model was robust under different 
specifications (available upon request). First, we kept only our significant control variables and 
used a restricted sample by including only the subsidiaries that received an explicit 
entrepreneurial mandate from their headquarters. Second, we ran our model with robust standard 
errors adjusted for subsidiary country clusters, for headquarters country clusters, and for 
subsidiary NACE (4 digits) clusters. Third, we ran the model using alternative control variables 
(e.g. number of years in a leadership position instead of age). Our results hold in these 
specifications and we are confident about the stability of our model.   
 
DISCUSSION 
We opened this paper by highlighting the dilemma that headquarters face when trying to manage 
subsidiary initiatives. Headquarters need to be involved to support the development and transfer 
of subsidiary initiatives. However, being involved interferes with the subsidiary managers’ 
activities and can harm their willingness to push for such initiatives. Our aim with this study was 
to show how MNCs can reconcile the inherent tension around the effects of headquarters 
16 
 
involvement in their subsidiary activities. We did so by studying the influence of mechanisms 
that can reduce the negative relationship between headquarters involvement and subsidiary 
manager initiative facilitation behavior. Our results show that headquarters that set up 
mechanisms that reduce the salience of boundaries between MNC units or that encourage 
individuals to cross those boundaries are at a lower risk of negatively influencing the proactive 
behavior of their subsidiary managers when managers from the headquarters cross these 
boundaries themselves and become involved in their subsidiaries.  
This paper makes important contributions to research on headquarters involvement and 
subsidiary initiatives. A few recent studies have suggested that we know little about the 
consequences of headquarters involvement for subsidiary manager behavior (Bouquet, Barsoux 
and Levi, 2015; Ciabuschi, Forsgren and Martin, 2011). Our study builds on that suggestion in 
investigating a behavior that facilitates the emergence and development of new ideas in 
subsidiaries: subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior. In this way, we are able to show 
that while headquarters might get involved to provide guidance and support for the development 
and transfer of innovative ideas (Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007; Ciabuschi, Dellestrand and 
Martin, 2011; Nell and Ambos, 2013), headquarters involvement in their subsidiaries harms a 
behavior that enables these ideas to emerge in the first place. We go one step further in 
identifying socialization mechanisms as boundary conditions for this dilemma. The firms in our 
study that had organizational and / or individual socialization mechanisms in place were less 
likely to see headquarters involvement as negatively influencing the initiative facilitation 
behavior of their subsidiary managers. In other words, these socialization mechanisms appear to 
be a way in which firms can reconcile the tension around the effects of headquarters involvement 
in their subsidiary activities. Additionally, while socialization mechanisms have mostly been 
conceptualized as ways to softly control the (re)actions of international subsidiaries (e.g., Nohria 
and Ghoshal, 1994; Björkman, Rasmussen and Li, 2004), we extend their applicability. 
Consistent with prior literature, our results suggest that socialization mechanisms can indeed 
control subsidiary managers’ reactions to headquarters’ actions in that subsidiary managers 
understand the rationale of headquarters involvement better and react more positively. Yet, our 
study also indicates that socialization mechanisms can limit inappropriate and undesired 
headquarters’ actions in that headquarters become more knowledgeable about when to be 
involved. In other words, socialization mechanisms enhance mutual interdependence between 
headquarters and subsidiaries so that opportunism from both sides is restrained. Thus, we build 
on the conceptual model by Foss, Foss and Nell (2012) regarding the use of socialization 
mechanisms to better manage headquarters involvement and the coordination of the MNC. While 
they suggested that socialization influences the extent to which headquarters get involved in their 
subsidiaries as well as how this involvement relates to MNC performance, our results suggest that 
it can also influence how headquarters involvement is perceived in the subsidiaries.  
In addition, our dependent variable extends research on subsidiary initiatives. Although 
subsidiary managers have the responsibility to support the realization of initiatives, little research 
has been done on what influences the extent to which they actually do so (O’Brien et al., 2018). 
Two literature reviews have noted that the individual actor has been neglected and have 
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suggested parallels with organizational behavior and the notion of proactive behavior (Schmid, 
Dzedek and Lehrer, 2014; Strutzenberger and Ambos, 2014). With this paper, we are directly 
addressing this issue in providing a measure that links proactive behavior (Morrison and Phelps, 
1999) with subsidiary initiatives (Ambos et al., 2010). More specifically, we increase our 
understanding of subsidiary manager behavior in showing that a key driver of subsidiary 
initiatives (i.e., subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior) can be negatively related to an 
important element that actually helps subsidiary initiatives to be useful in other parts of the firms 
(i.e., headquarters involvement). Along the lines of recent studies (O’Brien et al., 2018; 
Nuruzzaman, Gaur and Sambharya, 2018), this result stresses the importance of considering the 
behavior of subsidiary managers when studying subsidiary initiatives.  
On a more general level, our study extends our understanding of headquarters-subsidiary 
relationships (Mudambi, 2011; Narula, 2014; Foss, Foss and Nell, 2012). Our results show that 
managing the tension between the potentially positive effects of headquarters involvement on 
overall efficiency and coordination and the potentially negative effects of headquarters 
involvement on local proactive behaviors is very delicate. We contribute to this literature by 
highlighting ways to better manage relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Managerial relevance 
Our study provides implications for headquarters and subsidiary managers. Headquarters 
managers become involved with the aim of creating value for the whole firm. Our results show 
that, paradoxically, this involvement can be rather negative. Thus, headquarters managers need to 
be careful when intervening or becoming involved in their subsidiaries. Putting mechanisms in 
place that establish shared values, goals and a common corporate culture, as well as staffing 
subsidiary managers at headquarters, can – for example – be ways for headquarters managers to 
reduce the negative consequences of their involvement on proactive behaviors in their 
subsidiaries. In addition, it appears important for subsidiary managers to make use of the 
different socialization opportunities that are available to them in order to mitigate headquarters 
involvement as well as increase their understanding of why headquarters has become involved.  
Limitations and future research 
Our study comes with some limitations that offer exciting avenues for future research. First, 
while we aimed to investigate the individual behavior of proactively pushing for initiatives, we 
have not measured the motivation of subsidiary managers directly. Instead, we used motivation as 
an abstract intervening concept that guided our argumentation (see also Ambos and 
Schlegelmilch, 2007 and Egelhoff, 1982). Future studies could integrate more individual-level 
variables such as proactive personality, need for achievement, and motivation to provide a 
broader comprehension of what drives subsidiary managers to work towards global efforts. 
Second, the cross-sectional nature of our results makes it difficult to establish unidirectional 
relations between our constructs, despite the fact that our independent variable consists of 
activities that take time to develop and that likely took place prior to the behavior captured by the 
dependent variable. Future research could investigate headquarters involvement prior to the 
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behavior of subsidiary managers, as well as consequences at the subsidiary-level. Additionally, 
given the dynamic relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries, it would be interesting to 
see how subsidiary initiatives and headquarters involvement evolve over time within the same 
dyads. We have measured individual socialization mechanisms using a dummy variable, and 
future research could provide interesting and more detailed insights by using fine-grained 
measures of this concept. Finally, there are exciting research avenues regarding the role that 
fairness perceptions and social comparison play in subsidiary managers’ reactions to headquarters 
involvement.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. The hypothesized model 
Headquarters 
involvement 
Subsidiary manager 
initiative facilitation 
behavior 
Organizational 
socialization  
mechanisms 
Individual  
socialization 
mechanisms 
H1: - 
H2: + 
H3: + 
24 
 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlations  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Subsidiary manager initiative 
facilitation behavior 
1.000        
 
2 
Subsidiary manager age 0.079 1.000       
3 Subsidiary manager education -0.011 -0.010 1.000      
4 Subsidiary age 0.019 -0.032 0.024 1.000     
5 Subsidiary size 0.102 0.071 -0.031 0.041 1.000    
6 Past subsidiary initiatives 0.488*** 0.075 -0.040 0.105 0.171* 1.000   
7 Geographic distance -0.099 0.039 -0.095 -0.148 0.129 0.103 1.000  
8 
Main headquarters is corporate 
headquarters 
-0.194** 0.070 0.068 -0.064 0.067 -0.093 0.066 1.000 
9 Entrepreneurial mandate 0.228** 0.029 0.106 -0.049 0.149 0.252*** -0.026 0.159* 
10 Organizational socialization  0.113 0.007 0.129 0.126 0.228** 0.229** -0.103 -0.006 
11 Individual socialization 0.283*** 0.079 0.136 -0.185** 0.071 0.099 -0.124 -0.067 
12 Headquarters involvement 0.018 0.009 -0.039 -0.083 0.101 0.005 0.051 -0.063 
 Mean 5.875 50.45 0.792 28 234 4.918 1388 0.775 
 S.D. 0.836 7.515 0.408 24 327 1.332 2657 0.419 
          
  9 10 11 12     
9 Entrepreneurial mandate 1.000        
10 Organizational socialization  0.152* 1.000       
11 Individual socialization 0.152* 0.117 1.000      
12 Headquarters involvement 0.072 0.257*** 0.045 1.000     
 Mean 0.658 4.944 0.683 2.829     
 S.D. 0.476 1.221 0.467 1.281     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; N =120 
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Table 2. Results of OLS regressions models – dependent variable: subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Subsidiary Manager Age (logged) 0.145 0.106 0.104 0.097 -0.036 -0.015 
 (0.445) (0.448) (0.449) (0.437) (0.463) (0.449) 
Subsidiary Manager Education (dummy) -0.013 -0.047 -0.053 -0.063 -0.029 -0.042 
 (0.187) (0.172) (0.173) (0.159) (0.175) (0.164) 
Subsidiary Age (logged) -0.037 0.030 0.024 -0.017 0.009 -0.023 
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) 
Subsidiary Size (logged) 0.065 0.058 0.058 0.031 0.040 0.020 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) 
Subsidiary Past Initiatives (centered) 0.420*** 0.417*** 0.415*** 0.447*** 0.426*** 0.451*** 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.087) (0.082) (0.081) (0.079) 
Geographic Distance (logged) -0.054** -0.036 -0.038 -0.042 -0.029 -0.033 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Main Headquarters is Corporate HQ (dummy) -0.437** -0.386** -0.392** -0.434*** -0.440** -0.467*** 
 (0.172) (0.170) (0.168) (0.159) (0.173) (0.164) 
Entrepreneurial Mandate (dummy) 0.284* 0.242 0.245 0.280* 0.319* 0.334** 
 (0.169) (0.168) (0.170) (0.162) (0.165) (0.162) 
Organizational Socialization (centered)  -0.052 -0.045 -0.023 -0.051 -0.031 
  (0.094) (0.092) (0.087) (0.093) (0.086) 
Individual Socialization (dummy)  0.432** 0.428** 0.363** 0.442** 0.384** 
  (0.185) (0.187) (0.175) (0.185) (0.172) 
H1: HQ Involvement (centered)   -0.022 -0.084 -0.371** -0.358** 
   (0.081) (0.075) (0.170) (0.153) 
H2: HQ Involvement * Organizational Socialization    0.212**  0.181** 
    (0.088)  (0.088) 
H3: HQ Involvement * Individual Socialization      0.439** 0.356** 
     (0.187) (0.172) 
       
Constant -0.307 -0.707 -0.656 -0.344 -0.078 0.078 
 (1.774) (1.768) (1.799) (1.772) (1.855) (1.817) 
       
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.300*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.370*** 0.364*** 0.387*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2. Moderating effect of organizational socialization on the relationship between headquarters 
involvement and subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior (constant set to 3) 
 
 
Figure 3. Moderating effect of individual socialization on the relationship between headquarters 
involvement and subsidiary manager initiative facilitation behavior (constant set to 3) 
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
Low HQ involvement High HQ involvement
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
 m
an
ag
er
 i
n
it
ia
ti
v
e 
fa
ci
li
at
io
n
 
b
eh
av
io
r
Low organizational 
socialization                  
(β = -0.557; p<0.001)
High organizational 
socialization             
(β = -0.177; n.s.)
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
Low HQ involvement High HQ involvement
S
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
 m
an
ag
er
 i
n
it
ia
ti
v
e 
fa
ci
li
at
io
n
 
b
eh
av
io
r
No individual 
socialization                
(β = -0.358; p<0.001)
Individual socialization            
(β = -0.002; n.s.)
